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It  has been argued that solidarity, a normative concept of 
increasing prominence in the bioethics literature, 1 is  a value 
associated much more strongly with European than American 
social att i tudes, which typically emphasise the importance of 
individualism and personal freedom. 2 This difference is shown 
clearly in the ongoing, and increasingly heated, debate in the 
United States surrounding the nature of justice in health care 
provision. In this paper, I examine recent political  events 
surrounding the Trump administration’s attempts to repeal the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA),3 and 
identify the ideological commitments they express.  I note that 
opposition to the PPACA, and support for the Trump 
Administration’s attempts to repeal it ,4 is grounded in appeals 
to the importance of personal liberty,  and assertions that the 
cooperative,  solidaristic, elements of the PPACA (and by 
                                                          
1 Prainsack,  B.  & Buyx,  A.  (2017)  Sol idarity  in  Biomedic ine  and Beyond .  
Cambr idge:  Cambr idge Univers i ty Press;  AUTHOR 2016a.  
2 Häyry,  M.  (2005) .  “Precaut ion and  Solidar i ty,”  Cambridge  Quarterly  o f  
Heal thcare Ethics  14(02) .  P .  199;  Prainsack and  Buyx,  op.  c i t .  no te 1 .  P .  
8 .  
3 Patient  Protec tion and  Affordable Care Act,  (2010)  “Compilat ion  o f  
Patient  Pro tec tion and Affordab le Care Act:  Including Pat ient  Protect ion 
and  Affordable Care Act Health -Rela ted Por t ions o f  the Health Care  and  
Educat ion Reconci l iat ion Act o f 2010,”  Pub.  L.  No.  111 –148 974.  
4 Representat ive Diane Black,  “Amer ican Heal th Care Act  o f 2017,” Pub.  
L.  No.  H.R.  1628  (2017) ,  h t tps : / /www.congress.gov/bi l l /115 th -
congress /house -bi l l /1628.  
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extension, solidarist ic health care systems in gene ral) are 
inimical to the delivery of high-quality,  affordable health care.  
I argue that these claims are mistaken , and suggest one way of 
rejecting the implied cri ticisms of solidaristic practices in health 
care provision they represent. My defence of solidarity is  
phrased in terms of the advantages solidaristic approaches to 
health care provision have over individualist alternatives  in 
promoting certain important personal liberties,  and delivering 
high-quali ty, affordable health care . My goal is not to defend 
the PPACA itself, but rather to show that solidaristic health care 
systems typically generate high-quality health outcomes,  and 
that  they do so efficiently and cost-effectively.  I argue that  as a 
result ,  solidarist ic systems promote certain kinds of important 
liberties that  are neglected by the hyper-individualised approach 
favoured by critics of the PPACA. The conflict defined by 
libertarian opponents of solidaristic health care systems is not 
therefore between solidarity and liberty per se ,  but rather 
between solidarity and certain liberties for some people,  and 
non-solidarity and other l iberties for others . My contention 
therefore,  is  that  the libertarian argument against health care 
solidarity must do more to justify i ts r ejection of those goods 
promoted by solidaristic health care systems, which I argue even 
advocates of the libertarian position have good reasons to value.  
To make this argument, I first  set  out the key impacts of the 
PPACA, noting the benefits  that  it  generated for many, and 
commenting on its failures. Second, I outl ine the main crit icisms 
of the Act,  and explain the principles upon which they are 
based.5 Third, I explain the concept of solidarity and its  role in 
                                                          
5 Engagement wi th these  poli t ica l  arguments may perhaps st r ike some as 
excessive ly par t i san for  an academic paper .  However ,  as  I  expla in,  the  
noted comments o ffer  an exp lic i t ,  and pol icy focused ar t iculat ion of a  
spec i fic  l iber tar ian philosophical  perspect ive.  Consequently,  they offer  the 
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bioethical practice and health policy, contrasting it  with the 
strong individualism present in the American health care 
industry.  Fourth, I compare U.S. health care practices with those 
of other countries,  and note the relative ec onomic and 
epidemiological  costs associated with each approach. Finally,  I 
explain how solidaristic approaches to health care provision, in 
which participants cooperate with and support one another, can 
efficiently,  and cost -effectively deliver high qualit y health 
outcomes. I argue that they therefore preserve important 
individual freedoms which are neglected by non-solidaristic 
approaches which claim to prioritise individual freedom.  It will 
be noted therefore,  that  this argument does not focus directly on  
questions of justice  relating to the distribution of health care 
goods and services.  Instead, my goal is  to exploit  concern for 
the personal interests, in avoiding disease,  minimising economic 
costs, and safeguarding individual libert ies, of those who oppose 
duties to subsidise the health care costs of other persons.  This 
is not to deny the importance of the arguments derived from 
justice for the existence of duties to assist others, but rather to 
offer one additional  argument in favour of collaborative,  
cooperative,  and solidaristic approaches to health care  
provision. 
Impacts of the PPACA 
                                                          
per fec t  se t  o f  examples wi th  which to  i l lus tra te  the b roader  phi losophical  
debate  about  the  jus t i f icat ions  f or  adopt ing a given approach to  hea lth  care 
provis ion.  Further ,  the  potent ia l  impacts o f  the app licat ion of the  
pr incip les asser ted by these co mments,  in terms of l imitat ions to  the 
accessib il i ty o f heal th care for  mi l l ions o f  people,  mean that  not  only a r e  
they the appropriate  subject  for  an academic paper  such as this,  i t  i s  
arguably essen tia l  that  the academic communi ty (par t icular  in  b ioethics)  
engage wi th,  analyse  and,  where appropria te ,  cr i t ic ize  comments o f  the  
kind discussed belo w.  
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Prior to the enactment of the PPACA, health care in the U.S.A. 
was largely funded through free markets in health insurance. Of 
those insured, 55.7%, received coverage through employer 
funded insurance schemes, with a further 11.4% of the insured 
population having purchased insurance privately. 6 In addition, 
34.6% of insured Americans received insurance through 
government insurance programmes, such as Medicaid 7 or 
Medicare,8 Federal  insurance programmes for low-income, and 
elderly and disabled people respectively,  or through the 
military. 9 In total,  86.7% of Americans had some form of health 
insurance.  
It  is worth noting that each of the individual insurance systems 
present in the American heal th care market, with the possible 
exception of Medicaid and Medicare, is in itself a closed 
solidaristic enterprise, in that the members of each scheme share 
costs and risks, and thus engage in tacit, i f not overt , solidarist ic 
cooperation, within the conf ines of the scheme itself. Medicaid 
and Medicare differ slightly from this trend, in that as federal  
programmes, a proportion of their costs are covered by those 
who are not enrolees,  meaning that solidarity is  directed towards 
enrolees from outside the group. In this regard, the American 
health care industry should be acknowledged as including some 
solidaristic elements. However,  this solidari ty is typically 
limited to those within closed groups created by insurance 
                                                          
6 Barnet t  J .  C.  & Berchick,  E.  R.  (2017) .  Heal th  Insurance Coverage in  the  
Uni ted Sta tes:  2016 .  Washington DC: U.S.  Census Bureau.  P .4 .  
7 “Medicaid  |  Medicare.Gov,” accessed Apr il  12,  2017,  
ht tps: / /www.medicare.gov/your -medicare -costs /he lp -paying-
costs /medica id/medica id .html.  
8 “What’s Medicare?  |  Medicare.Gov,”  accessed  Apr il  12,  2017 ,  
ht tps: / /www.medicare.gov/s ign -up-change-p lans/dec ide -ho w-to-get -
medicare /whats -medicare/what - is -medicare.html .  
9 Barnet t  and Berchick,  op.  ci t .  note 9 .  P .4 .  
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providers (though employer provided insu rance programme 
typically receive tax subsidies which represent indirect 
solidarity directed towards enrolees from those outside of the 
group), who enjoyed authority to include, exclude, or expel 
(potential) group members as they saw fit. 10 This authority to 
exclude, combined with the freedom enjoyed by insurers to set  
prices were leading causes of the limited accessibility of health 
care for many in the United States.  Despite the presence of this 
limited, closed-group solidarity within cert ain aspects of the 
American health industry,  the system as a whole was far more 
individualist ic than those of most other wealthy countries.   
While the PPACA retained many of the market mechanisms 
which characterised the health industry prior to its  enactm ent,11 
the Act introduced stringent new regulations of the insurance 
industry,  extended protections for consumers, expanded access 
to health insurance, and increased the number of people eligible 
for Federal Medicaid assistance. 12 The aim of these changes was 
to improve the accessibility of insurance markets and expand 
enrolment in insurance programmes, simultaneously thereby 
driving down costs for enrolees,  and making health care 
available to all.  The Act therefore represented a paradigm shift  
in the way in which health care was funded and regulated in the 
United States, and can be seen as an attempt to extend the health 
care related solidarity confined with in individual insurance 
schemes and Federal  programmes to the American health care 
industry as a whole.  
                                                          
10 AUTHOR 2013.  
11 Gaffney A.  & McCormick,  D.  (2017) .  “The  Affordab le Care Act:  
Implicat ions for  Health -Care Equity,”  The Lancet  389(10077) .  P .  1444.  
12 Author  op .  c i t .  no te 13 .  
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However, while the Act did improve access to health care for 
many Americans, 13 by removing the ability of insurers to deny 
coverage to people with “pre -existing conditions” for example, 14 
it  was not without its (arguably major) flaws. For example,  
although the PPACA did reduce the number of Americans 
without insurance, i t  is predicted that  even if the Act is not 
repealed by the Trump Administration, “28 million people will 
remain uninsured in 2024 and beyond”. 15 Further,  significant 
levels of inequity persis t  in access to health care –  levels of 
uninsurance are far higher for Black and Hispanic people than 
they are for white people, for instance. 16 Similarly,  certain 
structures of the PPACA which were intended to reduce costs, 
such as allowing insurers to establish “narrow networks” of 
approved health care providers,  have been cri ticised for enabling 
them to exclude health centres which provide care for expensive 
to treat conditions. 17 In such cases,  costs are kept down by 
reducing the frequency with which an insurance scheme will  
have to cover the costs of expensive treatment –  a strategy which 
may have the effect of reducing the availabili ty of treatment for 
expensive to treat  conditions,  especially for poor people. 18  
Narrow networks have also restricted the range of options 
enrolees have in their choice of doctor –  a consideration which 
may be argued to significantly restrict  an important personal 
freedom, particularly if  one is no longer able to receive 
                                                          
13 Blumenthal ,  D. ,  Abrams,  M. & Nuzum,  R.  (2015) .  “The  Affordable Care  
Act  at  5  Years,”  New England Journal of  Medicine  372(25) .  P .2452; 
Gaffney and McCormick,  op.  ci t .  no te 14.  P .1443.  
14 AUTHOR op.  c i t .  note  13.  
15 Gaffney and McCormic k,  op .  c i t .  no te 14.  p .  1445.  
16 Ibid:  1445 .  
17 Ho ward,  D.  H.  (2014) .  “Adverse  Effects  o f  Prohib it ing Nar row Provider  
Networks,”  New England Journal of  Medic ine  371(7) .  Pp.  591–93.  
18 Ibid:  592 ;  Gaffney and McCormick,  op.  ci t .  no te 14,  pp.  1445 –46.  
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treatment from a physician with whom one has developed a close 
relationship.19 Correlatively,  the requirement that all insurance 
packages must cover at  least a minimum range of health risks 
limits the freedom to make decisions about per sonal health risks 
and how to manage them, by obliging people to purchase 
insurance which may provide more or different coverage than 
they would prefer. An additional consequence of this 
requirement is that  enrolees are likely to have to purchase 
insurance for health services that  they personally will  never use,  
a consideration I discuss in the following section.  
It  is  worth noting however,  that  a survey by the Henry J.  Kaiser 
Family Foundation found that 66% of those who had purchased 
health insurance through open markets regulated by the PPACA 
rated that insurance as “good” or “excellent”. 20 Additionally,  at 
least some of the failures of the PPACA can be attributed to 
significant ideological opposition and political obstruction. For 
example,  the PPACA originally required all states to expand 
their Medicaid programmes and guaranteed federal funds to 
cover the cost of this expansion, in order to improve the 
accessibility of health care for low income people.  However, 
following the Supreme Court of the United States of America’s 
decision in National Federation of Independent Business v.  
Sebelius ,21 this requirement became optional.  By the end of 
                                                          
19 “Fact  Check: You Can Keep Your Own Doctor ,”  accessed October  11 ,  
2017,  ht tp: / /po li t ica l t icker .b logs.cnn.com/2013/09/26/ fac t -check-you-
can-keep-your -own-doctor / .  Retr ieved 27 October  2017.  
20 Hamel,  L.  e t  a l . ,  (2016) .  “Survey of Non -Group Health  Insurance 
Enro llees,  Wave 3”.  Washington DC: The Henry J .  Kaiser  Family 
Foundation.  ht tps: / /www.kff .org/hea lth -reform/pol l - find ing/survey-of-
non-group-heal th-insurance -enro llees -wave-3/ .  Ret r ieved 27 October  
2017.  
21 Supreme Court  o f  the Uni ted  Sta tes,  (2012) .  NATIONAL FEDERATION 
OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS ET AL. v .  SEBELIUS, SECRETARY OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL. ,  No.  11 –393.  Supreme Court  
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2015, 19 States had opted out of the PPACA’s federally funded 
Medicaid expansion, severely l imiting the accessibility of health 
insurance for low income residents. 22 However, regardless of the 
reasons for these weaknesses of the PPACA, it remains true that  
some people are not well served by the Act, and it can be 
interpreted as imposing restrictions on certain kind s of arguably 
important freedom. In the following section I briefly outl ine the 
political rhetoric presented in opposition to the PPACA, and 
identify the philosophical commitments it  implies.  
Solidarity vs.  Individualism in American Health Care  
The debate surrounding justice in the provision of health and 
health care in the United States (and elsewhere)  is long-
running,23 and characterized by heated disagreement about the 
extent, and even existence, of enti tlements to health care, the 
identities of the people who enjoy such entit lements, and the 
duties correlating to them.24 The status of the PPACA was 
                                                          
of the  United  Sta tes o f  Amer ica ;  Rosenbaum, S .  & Westmore land,  T .  M. 
(2012)  “The Supreme Cour t ’s Surpr is ing Decis ion On The Medicaid 
Expansion:  Ho w Will  The Federa l  Government  And States  Proceed? ,” 
Heal th  Affa irs  31(8) .  Pp .1663–72.  
22 Han,  X.  e t  a l . ,  (2016) .  “Health -Rela ted  Outcomes among the Poor :  
Medicaid Expansion vs.  Non -Expansion States,”  PLOS ONE  10(12) .  
P .e0144429.  
23 Plaut ,  T .  F.  A.  & Arons ,  B.  S.  (1994)  “Pres ident  Clinton’s  Proposal  for  
Health Care Reform:  Key Provis ions and I s sues,”  Psychiatric  Serv ices  
45(9) ,  871–871; Got tschalk,  M. (1999) .  “The Missing Mil l ions:  Organized 
Labor ,  Business,  and the  Defeat  o f Cl inton’s Health Secur i ty Act,”  Journal  
of  Health  Poli t ics ,  Pol icy and Law  24(3) .  Pp.  489 –529; Budet t i ,  P .P .  (2004)  
“10 Years beyond the Health  Securi ty Act Fa ilure:  Subsequent  
Developments  and Persistent  Prob lems,” JAMA  292(16) .  Pp.2000–2006.  
24 Fried ,  C.  (1975) .  “Rights and Health Care —  Beyond Equi ty and  
Effic iency,” New England Journal  of  Medic ine  293(5) ,  pp.241–45;  
Daniels,  N.  (2008)  Just  Heal th:  Meet ing Heal th  Needs  Fair ly .  Cambridge,  
9 
 
arguably one of the most important  campaign issues in both the 
2012 and 2016 presidential  elections,  and has only grown more 
contentious during the presidency of Donald Trump. 25  
Political discourse surrounding opposit ion  to the PPACA is 
centred on two closely related claims; first,  that  the Act is  
inherently incapable of enabling the delivery of high -quality 
health care. 26 Second, that the legal requirements of the Act 
impose unjustifiable restrictions on important personal 
liberties.27 First , it  has been argued that by denying insurers the 
right to refuse insurance coverage to people with expensive 
health needs the PPACA would lead to a collapse of the health 
insurance market, leading to significant restrictions on the 
availabili ty and accessibility of care.  By requiring insurers to 
sell  insurance to people with pre -existing health conditions and 
expensive health  needs, it  was argued that the membership of 
insured groups would become dominated by a higher proportion 
of people with immediate and/or more -costly health care needs. 
Since these people are more  likely to make claims on their 
insurance this was argued to  lead to higher costs for insurance 
providers.28  
                                                          
UK: Cambr idge Univers i ty Press;  Wolff,  J .  (2012) .  The Human Righ t  to  
Heal th .  New York,  USA: W.W. Norton & Company,  Inc.  
25 Bal lotpedia :  The  Encyclopedia  o f Amer ican Poli t ics,  “Donald Trump 
President ial  Campaign,  2016/Heal thcare -  Ballo tpedia,”  Retr ieved  24 May 
2017,   
ht tps: / /bal lotped ia.org/Donald_Trump_pres identia l_campaign,_2016/Heal
thcare.  
26 Kantar j ian,  H.  M. (2017) .  “The Affordable Care Act,  or  Obamacare,  3  
Years  Later :  A Real i ty Check,” Cancer  123(1) .  p .  27,  
ht tps: / /do i .org/10 .1002/cncr .30384.  
27 Author  op .  c i t .  no te 13 . :  Author  op.  ci t .  note 1 .  
28 C-SPAN.Org (2017) .  Speaker Ryan Explains GOP Health  Care Plan Amid  
Growing Opposit ion.  ht tps: / /www.c -span.org/video/?425131 -1/speaker -
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Consequently,  because there would then be proportionately  
fewer people in the risk pool who do not make insurance claims , 
the income from premiums paid by healthy enrollees will  
gradually fall below the level at which it  is sufficient to cover 
the cost of care for less healthy enrollees. 29 In response, 
insurance providers would be incentivized to increase the cost 
of premiums in an attempt to cover the health care costs of the ir 
enrollees and maintain profits.  Doing so however, is also l ikely 
to encourage more people to opt -out of buying insurance, further 
undermining the sustainability of the insurance market. 30 
According to Paul Ryan, Speaker of the United States House of 
Representatives , the PPACA entered this “death spiral” and 
failed to adequately control the costs of health insurance  
precisely because it  relied upon young and healthy people 
engaging in solidarity with older, sicker people. 31  
Second, the Act has also been crit icized over the extent to which 
it obliges citizens to purchase insurance which provide s 
coverage for services which they may not want, and to which 
they may be ideologically opposed. 32 Here,  opposit ion centered 
on the importance of personal freedom, and the notion that the 
requirements of the Act violated the rights of Americans to be 
                                                          
ryan-explains-gop-heal th-care -p lan-amid-gro wing-opposi t ion.  06:42 of  
the video.  Retr ieved,  17  October  2017.  
29 Vinik,  D.  (2017 ,  March 3) .  “Three Mislead ing Claims from Paul Ryan’s  
Obamacare Lecture ,”  Pol i t ico:  The Agenda ,   
ht tp : / /www.poli t ico .com/agenda/story/2017/03 /three -mis lead ing-c la ims-
in-paul -ryans-obamacare- lecture -000349.  Retr ieved  10 October  2017.  
30 Ibid .  
31 C-SPAN.Org .  op.  c i t .  note 35.  13 :18 of the video.  
32 Parker ,  M.  (2017,  March 11) .  “Shimkus:  Men Paying for  Prenata l  Care  
Coverage l ike  Buying  a Cabin ‘You’re Never  Going to  Use, ’”  The 
Southern ,  h t tp : / / thesout hern.com/news/nat ional/ shimkus -men-paying-for -
prenatal -care -coverage -l ike -buying-a/ar t ic le_b86775bd -6a8e-5d33-9f2e-
1670ee1bb015.html .  Ret r ieved,  25 May 2017.  
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free to choose what , if any, insurance they needed. 33 In support 
of this view, health insurance was argued to be a commodity,  
which should be available through an open mark et,  al lowing 
Americans to purchase only the specific coverage they want,  and 
avoid services that they did not want,  thereby promoting their 
freedom of choice. 34 Correlatively,  it  was also argued that 
requiring all  insurance schemes to cover certain  “essential 
health benefits” 35 similarly restricted the rights of insurers,  and 
employers with responsibilit ies to provide insurance to 
employees,36 to provide coverage only for those goods they 
freely chose. This last consideration was particularly important 
in a series of legal cases in which it  was argued that the 
requirement to contribute to the cost of certain controversial  
services (such as abortion or contraception),  which were held to 
be immoral by some people, violated important rights to freedom 
of conscience.37  
Each of these criticisms of the PPACA is grounded in a 
commitment to the primary importance of certain kinds of 
negative liberty,  ei ther for instrumental reasons (i.e. , that 
promoting liberty preserves health care markets), or because it  
is taken to have intrinsic lexical priority over other valuable 
goods. It  is  unclear however, how well these commitments were 
served by the American health care industry prior to the advent 
of the PPACA. As I argue below, the hyper -individualised  
approach to health care provision overlooks certain important 
kinds of liberty,  and can restrict  liberty and the accessibility of 
health care for many people.  For instance, in 2013, 
                                                          
33 AUTHOR, op.  c i t .  note 13.  
34 Ibid .  
35 Patient  Protec tion and Affordable Care Act ,  op.  ci t .  no te 3 .  sec.  
1302(b)(1) ,  ht tp: / /www.hhs.gov/hea lthcare /r ights/ law/.  
36 Author  2016b .  
37 AUTHOR, op.  c i t .  note 13. :  AUTHOR, op .  c i t .  note 45.  
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approximately 41.8 million Americans lacked insurance.38 I also 
argue that  the claim that solidaristic systems of health care 
provision are unsustainable,  or unable to deliver quali ty care is 
of questionable force, given the success of such systems in most 
other wealthy countries.  To make this argument ,  I first  briefly 
outline the various definitions of solidarity,  and explain how the 
core implications of the concept are present in the health care 
systems of most wealthy countries .   
Solidarity in Health Care Provision  
The concept of solidarity has a lengthy hist ory in political and 
social  philosophy. 39 It  is  present,  by implication at least , in the 
social  contract  traditions of the 18 t h  Century, 40 in which the 
emergence of the state was argued to be grounded in the 
“universal human need for society and protection f rom harm”.41 
More recently,  solidari ty as emerged as a central concept in 
bioethical discourse, with its  core features and implications 
being the subject of extensive debate. 42 It  has been argued, for 
example,  to play an important role in motivating the fulf illment 
of duties to contribute to the health care needs of other persons 
                                                          
38 Barnet t  & Berchick,  op.  ci t .  note 9 .  P .  4 .  
39 Scholz ,  S.  J .   (2009)  Pol i t ical  Sol idari ty .  Pennsylvania:  Penn State  Press;  
Stjernø,  S.  (2005) .  Solidari ty  in  Europe:  The His tory o f  an Idea .  
Cambr idge,  UK: Cambridge  Universi ty Press ;  AUTHOR 2016C.  
40 Locke,  J .  (1980) .  Second Treat ise of  Government .  Indianapolis  USA:  
Hackett  Publishing:  Rousseau,  J .J .  (2000) .  Discourse on the Orig in of  
Inequali ty .  Oxford,  UK. Oxford  Univers i ty Press;  Hobbes ,  T .  (2008) .  
Leviathan .  Oxford ,  UK: Oxford Univers i ty Press .  
41 AUTHOR, op.  c i t .  note 93.  
42 Jennings,  B.  (2012) .  “The  Place of Sol idar i ty in Publ ic  Heal th Ethics,”  
Public  Heal th  Reviews  34(1) .  Pp.65;  Krishnamur thy,  M.  (2013) .  “Poli t ical  
Sol idar i ty,  Just ice and Publ ic  Health ,”  Public  Health  Ethics  6(2) .  Pp.129–
41; van den Hoven,  M.  & Verweij ,  M. (2013) .  “Profess ional  So lidar i ty:  
The Case of Influenza Immuniza tion,” The American Journal o f  Bioeth ics  
13(9) .  Pp.51–52; Pra insack & Buyx,  op .  c i t .  no te 1 . .  
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nationally and globally, 43 and to contribute to the development 
of welfare states which serve the health and social needs of al l 
citizens.44 
The breadth of contexts in which solidarity  is increasingly held 
to be relevant in bioethical debate is matched by the range of 
accounts of the concept ’s defining features,  as has been 
discussed in more detail elsewhere. 45 However,  while the 
different interpretations of solidarity vary in their specifics,  
most accounts share significant common ground. To illustrate,  
solidarity is widely held to be “closely linked to the social, 
political, moral and ethical connections that exist between 
people”,46 and to emphasise and motivate,  cooperation between 
persons. Similarly,  most accounts of solidarity recognize it as 
an active concept,  rather than a mere attitude –  that is , to engage 
in solidarity with other persons, one must act on  their behalf,  
rather than merely empathise with them. 47 For example, Bruce 
Jennings and Angus Dawson have described solidarity as the act  
of ‘“standing up for”, “standing up with”, and  “standing up 
as”’48 those persons with whom it is  identified –  an inherently 
active, and relational definition of the concept.  
                                                          
43 Segall ,  S.  (2007) .  “In Solidar i ty wi th the Imprudent:  A Defense of Luck 
Egal i tar ianism,”  Socia l  Theory and  Practice  33(2) .  Pp.  177–98;  Widdo ws,  
H. (2011) .  “Localized Past ,  Global ized Future:  Towards an Effec tive  
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Medical  Tourism” Bioethics  25(2) .  P .  85 ;  Author ,  op.  c i t ,  no te 1 .  
44 Weale ,  A.  (1990) .  “Equali ty,  Social  Sol idar i ty,  and the Welfare Sta te ,”  
Ethics  100(3) .  p .77;  Ter  Meulen,  R. ,  Arts ,  W.  & Muffe ls,  R.  
(2013)Solidari ty  in  Heal th  and Social  Care  in  Europe .  69 .  
45 AUTHOR, op.  c i t .  note 94.  
46 Ibid . ,  1 .  
47 Ibid . ,  2 .  
48 Jennings,  B.  & Angus  Dawson,  A.  (2015)  “Sol idar i ty in the Moral  
Imagina tion of Bioethics,”  Hast ings  Center  Report  45(5) .  P .  35.  
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Prainsack and Buyx identify three “tiers” of solidarity ,  through 
which these features of the concept can be enacted ; first, 
solidarity can occur between individuals –  “[i]f Ayse suffered 
from regular back pain when she was pregnant and offers her 
seat [on a crowded bus] to Ivo who seems to have a painful back 
while standing up, this represents a practice of solidarity at tier 
1”.49 Here, “Ayse” recognises a similarity she shares with “Ivo” 
and gives up her seat  for her, incurring the cost of standing on a 
busy bus –  an informal, immediate interaction . Second, 
solidarity can be present in group settings, represented by 
“[m]anifestations of collective  commitments to carry costs to 
assist others” (my italics ).50 One example of such informal, 
collective solidarity is the emergence of networks of people with 
the same disease, organised to share information, provide mutual 
support , or raise funds for common causes. 51 This collective 
solidarity is distinguished from the third tier identified by 
Prainsack and Buyx by its informality –  solidaristic cooperation 
emerges here from collective identification of similarities of 
interest,  rather than the formal, legalised solidarity of tier three.   
The final  tier represents the most formal “institutionalised” form 
of solidarity “often in the form of legally enforceable norms ”.52 
Prainsack and Buyx describe this kind of formalised, 
institutional solidarity as “solidifying”, and emerging from, the 
willingness of individual persons to carry costs to benefit 
others.53 This kind of “tier three” solidarity is instantiated by the 
cooperative health care systems of wealthy countries like the 
U.K. and Germany. Systems in these countries require residents 
                                                          
49 Prainsack & Buyx,  op.  Ci t .  no te 1 .  P .  54.  
50 Ibid:  55 .  
51 Ibid . ,  55–56.  
52 Ibid . ,  56–57.  
53 Author ,  op.  c i t .  note  13 :  Author ,  op ci t .  note 44 .  
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to contribute to the cost  of universal health care provision 
through the payment of tax contributions, or the purchase of 
health insurance in a high ly regulated market. In this way, costs 
are shared –  the healthy subsidise the care costs of the sick, men 
contribute to the costs of women’s care (and vice versa), and the 
wealthy aid the poor.  Though it  should be acknowledged that 
European countries do t ypically place some limits on the range 
of persons to whom solidarity is owed. For example,  
undocumented migrants are not usually entitled to make use of 
the full  range of services (if any) to which documented residents 
enjoy access. 54 Cooperative,  solidaristic systems are intended to 
ensure that all  persons enjoy access to at  least  basic health care 
services; the PPACA sought to incorporate this kind of tier three 
solidarity.   
Promoting Health and Liberty Through Solidarity  
As discussed above, opposition t o the solidaristic commitments 
of the PPACA is grounded in two central claims; first, the 
“quality” argument claims that the subsidisation of vulnerable 
people by the less vulnerable is unsustainable, and would lead 
to worse health outcomes for all .  Second, the “libertarian” 
argument states that  the solidaristic elements of the PPACA 
unjustifiably restricts the liberty of Americans . In this section, 
I examine these claims in turn, with reference to the outcomes 
achieved by health care systems in wealthy countries which rely, 
to differing degrees, on the  kinds of solidaristic cooperation 
rejected by critics of the PPACA.  
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First,  the “quality” argument can be challenged with reference 
to the efficiency of,  and successes in health promotion enjoyed 
by, solidaristic systems in other wealthy countries, and to  two 
significant failures associated with non -solidaristic systems. As 
noted above, most wealthy countries employ some form of 
cooperative,  solidarity based model to ensure that their residents 
enjoy access to at least basic health care services. 55 As systems 
involving solidaristic cooperation, they function through the 
kind of subsidisation, of the sick by the healthy or the poor by 
the wealthy, criticised as a key reason that the PPACA would be 
unsustainable,  and unable to deliver quality care.  However,  as  
demonstrated by repeated studies,  these systems consistently 
deliver health care to their enrolled populations more 
efficiently,  more accessibly,  and more affordably than the 
American approach. 56 While factors other than solidarity may 
have contributed to the strengths of these systems, based on 
these successes we can conclude that  s olidari ty,  contrary to 
Ryan’s comments, does not inevitably lead to unsustainability ,  
inaccessibility,  or lower quality care. Indeed, it  has been shown 
that  prior to the PPACA fully coming into effect  “the United 
States health care system [was] the most expensive in the world, 
but comparative analyses consistently show the U.S. 
underperforms relative to other countries on most dimensions of 
performance”. 57 There is good reason therefore to view a 
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56 Schoen,  C.  et  a l . ,  (2010) .  “Ho w Heal th Insurance Design Affects Access  
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solidaristic health care strategy as a cheaper, 58 more efficient 
approach,59 which offers better health outcomes for more 
people,60 than the kind of hyper-individualised strategy 
suggested as an alternative to the PPACA. To illustrate, when 
evaluating the impacts of repealing the PPACA in favour of one 
of the Trump Administration’s failed alternatives, the American 
Health Care Act (AHCA), the U.S. Congressional Budget Office 
predicted that  by 2026 there would be an additional 23 million 
uninsured people compared to predicted outcomes for the 
PPACA as a result  of the repeal .61 Largely this increase is 
predicted to result from restrictions of Medicaid eligibili ty,  
though the AHCA would also allow insurers to charge people 
with pre-existing conditions extremely high premiums, 
potentially excluding many from needed insurance. 62 
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November  2017.  
62 Representat ive Diane Black,  op .  ci t .  no te 4;  Doran,  W. (2017,  May 4) .  
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The efficiency, accessibility,  and health outcomes of solidarist ic 
health care systems provide a significant challenge to claims 
that  such systems are inherently unsustainable,  and incapable of 
delivering quality care. Nonetheless, in and of themselves,  these 
considerations may not be sufficient to convince people who are 
ideologically opposed to solidarity in health care,  or those who 
may see an increase in their personal financial costs as a result 
of obligations to purchase insurance. However,  it  has been 
argued that  improving the accessibility of health care,  e specially 
for preventative services, can have significant public health 
benefits , which all  persons have reason to value,  regardless of 
their ability or desire to purchase insurance under an 
individualist ic system. 63 Given that  solidaristic systems have 
been shown to achieve higher accessibility of health care, 64 there 
are arguably strong self -interested reasons for al l people to 
participate in such systems, because doing so can offer effective 
protections against a wide range of serious threats to health. 65 
Indeed, U.S. health care policy does rely,  impli citly at least,  on 
solidarity for the delivery of certain public health programmes, 
which generate benefits for al l U.S. residents.  For example,  
approximately 57% of the cost of vaccination programmes in the 
United States is  met by federal funding. 66 While the provision of 
federally funded vaccines to low income people confers direct  
benefits  to recipients, it  also benefits  those who pay for vaccines  
privately,  by increasing the proportion of vaccinated people in 
the U.S.A.,  reinforcing herd immunity and reducing the risk of 
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65 AUTHOR 2014,  pp.297 -298.  
66 Hinman,  A.  R. ,  Orenstein,  W. A.  & Rodewald ,  L. ,  (2004) .  “Financing  
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outbreaks of vaccine preventable diseases. 67  Thus, the financial 
costs imposed on those who contribute to funding vaccinations 
for other people through taxation are offset  by their reduced 
health vulnerabil ities.  
However, while there are solidaristic systems in place in the 
U.S.A. which offer protection against  the threat posed by certain 
infectious diseases, these are limited, and as a result are unable 
to compensate for vulnerabilities allowed by the predominantly 
individualist  system. For example,  an outbreak of HIV in 
Indiana in 2015 was largely the result of public health policy 
which failed to extend protections to those unable to afford them 
privately. 68 This outbreak was traced to “extensive needle 
sharing by people who inject drugs”. 69 Indiana criminalises the 
possession of needles without a prescription and had not 
explicitly permitted needle exchanges,  making it  harder for 
intravenous drug users to protect themselves from the threat of  
infection.70 In addition, budget cuts for health led to the closure 
of the only clinic providing free, anonymous HIV testing in the 
county at the centre of the outbreak. 71 Here, the absence of 
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accessible public health services 72 exposed already vulnerable 
people to severe risk of harm, and led to the preventable 
outbreak of a serious threat to public health. 73  
HIV cannot be transmitted through casual contact  between 
infected and uninfected persons, unlike diseases such as measles 
or tuberculosis, meaning that  the risks associated with infected 
populations are different for HIV than they are for other 
“conventionally” infectious diseases. Consequently,  it  may be 
objected that  it  is  unfair to refer to this case in support the claim 
that engaging in solidarity to  promote public health offers 
epidemiological  benefits to those who can privately afford 
treatment and prophylaxis. However, as with conventionally 
transmitted infections, a higher proportion of people living with 
HIV (or any other sexually transmitted inf ection) within a given 
community does increase the risk of further infections,  
regardless of the means of transmission. 74 The Indiana crisis thus 
provides a startling example of the public health risks associated 
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with failures to deliver accessible health c are services to all 
people.  
An additional consideration, which adds weight to the argument 
for solidaristic cooperation in the provision of health care 
services,  is that the financial  costs of solidaristic  health care 
systems are typically lower than their individualist 
counterparts. 75 To illustrate,  as a result  of the individualist 
approach to public health provisions in Indiana, the cost to tax 
payers of responding to the HIV crisis is  estimated at  between  
$160 and $250 million. 76 In comparison, a publicly funded HIV 
prevention programme in Washington D.C. cost $650,000 in i ts  
first two years of operation, and was estimated to have prevented 
120 new infections,  and to have saved the city $44.3 million. 77 
Investing in the health of other people, through solidaristic 
cooperation in meeting the costs of health care can thus reduce 
our vulnerability to significant risk,  and minimise the cost  of 
health care overall.   
There are thus good reasons, derived from self -interest , even for 
those who endorse an individualist  health care strategy , to at 
least seriously consider  an alternative based on solidarity.  
However,  it  may still  be objected that  despite the noted 
advantages of solidarist ic health care strategies, they st il l  
impose unjustifiable restrictions on important personal 
freedoms, such as the freedom to choose one’s physician. While 
these concerns should not be ignored, there are at least three 
reasons why they should not be taken as grounds to reject a 
solidaristic health strategy; first ,  the freedoms with which they 
are concerned may be of questionable or limited value.  Second, 
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general personal freedom may be promoted more effectively by 
placing limited restrictions on such questionably valuable 
liberties.  Third, doing so may be required even by a view of 
justice which prioritizes the protection and promotion of 
individual freedom.  
First,  and most specifically to the objections discussed above,  
the value of the noted freedoms (to choose one’s personal health 
care strategy and physician), and the extent to which they should 
be prioritized in a non-ideal context in which it  is  not possible 
to promote all freedoms is unclear . For example,  the freedom to 
choose which health insurance to buy, if any, is  presented by 
opponents of solidaristic health care strategies as respecting 
individual agency, and deferring to expertise uniquely held by 
each individual about their personal health needs. 78 However,  the 
value of being free to make such choices is questionable.  As has 
been argued by Ronald Dworkin, the economic and epistemic 
conditions in which such choices could be adequately informed 
and freely made do not presently exist;  many people lack the 
financial resources to purchase the insurance that they would 
ideally choose, and most lack the appropriate expertise  and 
knowledge to accurately evaluate  their personal risks and thus 
insure themselves to the level that they believe is appropriate. 79 
To illustrate, even if Susan has sufficient resources to purchase 
what she believes to be her ideal insurance package, and believes 
that  she has insured herself to the level appropriate to her risk 
preferences, she is unlikely to have the knowledge and expertise 
to ensure that her decision is based on accurate information. 80 
Thus, while Susan may be free, in the  narrow sense of being able 
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to make unrestricted choices ,  given the limitations  on l iberty 
that can be imposed by deprivations of health, it  is unclear that  
her freedom to make poorly-informed, resource-constrained 
choices is in fact a valuable freedom, the preservation of which 
should be prioritized over other possible freedoms.  
Second and correlatively,  even accepting that  the freedom to 
make unconstrained choices is valuable,  i t  is unclear that such a 
freedom actually promotes personal freedom more generally.  In 
Susan’s case,  it  can be argued that  her general l iberty would be 
promoted more effectively if she were to “give up” this minor 
freedom in favour of  mandatory participation in a cooperative 
health care system based on solidarity.  W hile doing so will 
(arguably)  impose some restrictions on certain freedoms, these 
restrictions are offset by the benefits of having access to health 
care, which reduces the risk that personal liberty will  be 
constrained by deprivations of health . Correlatively,  
participating in solidaristic systems which serve the health 
needs of all  people minimises the costs of protecting one’s own 
health, thereby increasing the resources available to pursue 
one’s own life goals and thereby promote s, rather than restrict s, 
personal liberty. On balance therefore, it  can be argued that the 
obligation to cooperate in a health care strategy based on 
solidarity promotes, rather than constrai ns liberty.81 
Finally,  while solidaristic health care systems typically impose 
lower financial  burdens on their members than individualist 
systems, it  remains possible that some people may incur higher 
personal costs in a solidaristic health care system . For example,  
someone who declines to purchase any insurance under an 
individualist  system will incur additional costs under a system 
in which they must contribute financially. However, such costs 
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are not incompatible with a strong commitment to the 
importance of liberty,  and may be required to promote liberty 
more generally.  Such restrictions are arguably required by 
Rawlsian liberalism, because they safeguard liberty more 
generally82 by ensuring that al l persons are able to access at least  
basic health care services,  which Rawls acknowledges are vital  
for personal freedom. 83 The small sacrifice of the freedom of 
total  control over all of one’s personal resources  is  necessary to 
ensure that all  persons are able to enjoy a similar system of 
liberties: an outcome which is not possible when the kind of 
absolute freedom proposed by critics of a health care strategy 
based on solidarity is prioritised. There are therefore, 
circumstances in which restrictions on personal liberty are 
justifiable, 84 and it  is  possible for restrictions on liberty in one 
area to promote liberty more generally, both for society as a 
whole,  and  for those individuals whose initial liberties are 
constrained.  
Indeed, such minor restrictions in liberty are arguably accepted 
by many who favour the priori tisation of personal freedom when 
these costs are imposed by duties to contribute to other social  
goods which promote individual welfare and liberty.  For 
example,  all tax-payers in any given state contribute to the cost  
of having a system of laws and the means to enforce them, even 
if certain individuals are able to personally afford to pay for 
private security services.  Being required to contribute to the 
costs of a police force with which one may never directly 
interact  does restrict  the liberty of those with private security 
services, in that they do not have total  control over all of their 
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resources, but it  would be implausible to suggest that they 
should not have to make such contributions.  However, if we 
accept the libertarian argument outlined above with regard to 
health care, we must also accept the same arguments as they 
apply to social  goods l ike system of laws and the means to 
preserve and enforce them. This is because,  in both cases small 
sacrifices of personal liberty are demanded in order to deliver 
goods which promote liberty and welfare generally,  and not only 
for those who fulfil  the duties in question. It  might be objected 
at this claim that this is because they benefit from the systemic 
protections of living in a stable so ciety governed by the law 
more broadly, whereas there are no analogous systemic benefits 
associated with ensuring the universal availabili ty of health 
care.  However, this is to ignore the benefits of such universally 
available health care noted in the firs t half of this section.  
Conclusion 
Opposition to the PPACA is grounded in  an ideological 
commitment to hyper-individualism in health care provision , 
which is i tself justified by the asserted belief that  individualis tic 
health care strategies  best  promote personal liberty and quali ty 
health care.  My goals in this paper have been fourfold;  first,  to 
challenge the claim that solidaristic health care systems 
unjustifiably restrict  liberty,  and deliver lower quali ty health 
care, and outcomes, to patients than individualist  or libertarian 
systems. Second, to highlight the limitations of libertarian 
health care strategies, and not e that while some liberties for 
some people are promoted  by such strategies ,  they impose 
significant restrict ions on the f reedoms of many others. Third,  
in doing so, to show that the philosophical conflict  at the heart  
of this debate is not between solidarity and liberty per se ,  but 
rather between solidarity and certain liberties for some people,  
and non-solidarity and other liberties for others. Finally,  and 
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based on these considerations,  to demonstrate that  solidaristic 
health care systems promote goods that  libertarian crit ics of 
solidarity ostensibly value, and that  there are therefore  good 
reasons for them to adopt or at least  consider  solidarist ic 
national health strategies .  This paper thus challenges critics of 
the PPACA to offer a more nuanced argument in favour of 
individualism, which acknowledge the limitations of the ir 
approach, and justifies their rejection o f the benefits  associated 
with solidarist ic health care systems.  
